The Officer May/June 2011 : Page-10

Army BoB Feidler • director, Army ProgrAms 20/20 Vision Resources, accsessibility critical for an operational reserve. he Army Reserve is at a critical juncture. It has evolved from a strategic reserve — beginning in the 1990s — to an operational reserve. Given extreme fiscal constraints and clear signals from Congress that the Department of Defense will have to bear its share of future budget cuts, the challenge for the Army Reserve is clearly whether it will remain an enduring operational force. Will it be organized, modernized, postured, and resourced to provide support to the Total Army, combatant commanders, and civil authorities? The top priorities for the Army Reserve must be: adequate resources (funding), accessibility to their services, and support for Soldiers and their families. With blueprints for the Army Reserve’s future in the Army Reserve Vision & Strategy 2020 and the Army Reserve Campaign Plan , a wariness exists that the Army Reserve might be put back into the “strategic reserve” box. This would reduce the operational ability of the Army Reserve and needlessly squander resources and experiences that the Army Reserve has constructed over the past decade. To remain an enduring operational force and the premier force provider of Citizen Warriors for planned and emerging missions, the Army Reserve must be adequately resourced and accessible. In areas such as transportation, medical, civil affairs, engineering, and information operations, the Army Reserve provides a substantial portion of the force. Although the expense for these units when employed operationally is the same as for Active Component units, maintenance is much lower when they are not in active status. Reserve Component units also can respond to homeland emergencies, although the laws governing accessibility to the Army Reserve desperately need amendment to permit broader usage in domestic emergencies and access for call-up by the Secretary of Defense for theater engagement and similar missions. We have built an Army that is dependent on the Army Reserve; now we must fund it. The Army Reserve is an enabler for the Total Army through its provision of rotational units (enablers) cyclically under the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. The current model calls for a unit to have a dwell time ratio of 1:5 (one year deployed and five years at home station). The cycle begins 10 the as a unit resets and trains; it then becomes ready, and finally joins the available pool force. If a unit is not in the rotational element of the force, it is in the generating force (e.g., training divisions or mobilization support) or one of the 22 operational and functional commands. These entities are nonrotational but always available as additional capacity to the operational force, such as units from the train/ready force pools if a surge is required. Critical is that units not be classified as ready when, in fact, due to restricted training, they might not be. The Army Reserve Campaign Plan 2011 , effective in March 2011, is the primary strategic management tool developed to implement change in support of Vision & Strategy 2020 and the Army Campaign Plan. It focuses on those actions and activities required to shape and adapt the Army Reserve operating and generating forces and their associated institutions and agencies. The plan includes 32 major objectives the Army Reserve must accomplish in the next year and a half to meet the needs of the units and Soldiers. Pressing issues include the shaping of the force and developing a true continuum of service to ease transitions within duty statuses, such as active, active reserve, and inactive reserve. For an enduring operational reserve—especially in a time of fiscal constraints—the Army Reserve must match its capabilities to the needs expressed in the National Military Strategy , the Guidance for Employment of the Force , and the various combatant command campaign plans. It can only do this with sufficient resources. As a result, the Army Reserve should be fully included in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 13-17 process at funding levels reflecting an operational—not strategic—reserve and be fully included within the Total Army Analysis strategy that sets the Active Component/Reserve Component enabler mix and expectations of the Active Component for the Army Reserve. Given the severe fiscal pressure the defense structure will face in years to come, an operational Army Reserve offers the most cost-effective solution. It will be essential that units are properly trained and accessible by the Secretary of Defense for a variety of missions, including domestic emergencies.  O fficer / M ay –J une 2011

Army

Bob Feidler

20/20 Vision<br /> <br /> Resources, accsessibility critical for an operational reserve.<br /> <br /> The Army Reserve is at a critical juncture. It has evolved from a strategic reserve—beginning in the 1990s—to an operational reserve. Given extreme fiscal constraints and clear signals from Congress that the Department of Defense will have to bear its share of future budget cuts, the challenge for the Army Reserve is clearly whether it will remain an enduring operational force. Will it be organized, modernized, postured, and resourced to provide support to the Total Army, combatant commanders, and civil authorities? The top priorities for the Army Reserve must be: adequate resources (funding), accessibility to their services, and support for Soldiers and their families.<br /> <br /> With blueprints for the Army Reserve’s future in the Army Reserve Vision & Strategy 2020 and the Army Reserve Campaign Plan, a wariness exists that the Army Reserve might be put back into the “strategic reserve” box. This would reduce the operational ability of the Army Reserve and needlessly squander resources and experiences that the Army Reserve has constructed over the past decade. To remain an enduring operational force and the premier force provider of Citizen Warriors for planned and emerging missions, the Army Reserve must be adequately resourced and accessible.<br /> <br /> In areas such as transportation, medical, civil affairs, engineering, and information operations, the Army Reserve provides a substantial portion of the force. Although the expense for these units when employed operationally is the same as for Active Component units, maintenance is much lower when they are not in active status. Reserve Component units also can respond to homeland emergencies, although the laws governing accessibility to the Army Reserve desperately need amendment to permit broader usage in domestic emergencies and access for call-up by the Secretary of Defense for theater engagement and similar missions. We have built an Army that is dependent on the Army Reserve; now we must fund it.<br /> <br /> The Army Reserve is an enabler for the Total Army through its provision of rotational units (enablers) cyclically under the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. The current model calls for a unit to have a dwell time ratio of 1:5 (one year deployed and five years at home station). The cycle begins as a unit resets and trains; it then becomes ready, and finally joins the available pool force. If a unit is not in the rotational element of the force, it is in the generating force (e.g., training divisions or mobilization support) or one of the 22 operational and functional commands. These entities are nonrotational but always available as additional capacity to the operational force, such as units from the train/ready force pools if a surge is required. Critical is that units not be classified as ready when, in fact, due to restricted training, they might not be.<br /> <br /> The Army Reserve Campaign Plan 2011, effective in March 2011, is the primary strategic management tool developed to implement change in support of Vision & Strategy 2020 and the Army Campaign Plan. It focuses on those actions and activities required to shape and adapt the Army Reserve operating and generating forces and their associated institutions and agencies.The plan includes 32 major objectives the Army Reserve must accomplish in the next year and a half to meet the needs of the units and Soldiers. Pressing issues include the shaping of the force and developing a true continuum of service to ease transitions within duty statuses, such as active, active reserve, and inactive reserve.<br /> <br /> For an enduring operational reserve—especially in a time of fiscal constraints—the Army Reserve must match its capabilities to the needs expressed in the National Military Strategy, the Guidance for Employment of the Force, and the various combatant command campaign plans. It can only do this with sufficient resources. As a result, the Army Reserve should be fully included in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 13-17 process at funding levels reflecting an operational—not strategic—reserve and be fully included within the Total Army Analysis strategy that sets the Active Component/Reserve Component enabler mix and expectations of the Active Component for the Army Reserve.<br /> <br /> Given the severe fiscal pressure the defense structure will face in years to come, an operational Army Reserve offers the most cost-effective solution. It will be essential that units are properly trained and accessible by the Secretary of Defense for a variety of missions, including domestic emergencies.

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