The Officer January/February 2011 : Page 24

iRreGuLAr Analysis: Army Reconstruction Team concept is tailor-made for the Reserve Component to fulfill new capabilities. By BG Bud R. Jameson Jr. With the nation still engaged in combat operations on fronts in the Middle East and Southwest Asia— each at a different point along the continuum of our national effort—many sincere efforts continue that comply with the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.07, “Irregular Warfare” (IW), published Dec. 1, 2008. The directive instructs respective military departments to develop capabilities to address irregular challenges to U.S. national security. In seeking to provide what the warfighters and the nation require, especially with regard to the interagency (IA) process, DoD continues to mobilize Reserve Component Soldiers and has created the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce to provide individual civilian personnel to the existing provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). The Army also continues to train and field human-terrain teams to assist the brigade combat teams. The Army War College is researching PRT-like solutions to the ongoing need. The National Defense University is conducting a study to synthesize and provide recommendations to improve the IA process. And even the National Guard is fielding ad hoc agribusiness teams into Afghanistan to augment ongoing PRT and Civil Affairs efforts. However, none of these efforts, alone or together, will be the panacea to the nation’s requirements. DoD must develop additional capabilities specifically tailored to meet the Secretary of Defense’s requirements as stipulated in the DoD IW Directive: “[To] maintain capabilities and capacity so that the Department of Defense is as effective in IW as it is in traditional warfare in order to ensure that, when directed, the department can . . . create a safe, secure environment in fragile states and, if required, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure restoration, and humanitarian relief.” And, in line with Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ efforts to move away from efforts to use “baroque and costly platforms” to provide capabilities, any solution to the capabilities gap in the IW arsenal should be as people-centric a solution as possible. The ongoing efforts listed above are not so targeted. Instead, they continue to be reactive within existing force structure and doctrinal paradigms. But the creation of Army Reconstruction Teams (ARTs) would not only be people-centric, it would provide a much-needed, new capability to combatant commanders as directed in the DoD Directive to “conduct IW Soldiers and Airmen with Zabul Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) return to base after a quality assurance, quality control patrol near Qalat in Zabul province, Afghanistan. Air Force 24 the O fficer / J anuary –f ebruary 2011

Irregular Warfare

BG Bud R. Jameson Jr.

Analysis: Army Reconstruction Team concept is tailor-made for the Reserve Component to fulfill new capabilities.<br /> <br /> Employers, as well as Reservists, must bear the brunt of extended deployments and separation from work.<br /> <br /> With the nation still engaged in combat operations on fronts in the Middle East and Southwest Asia— each at a different point along the continuum of our national effort—many sincere efforts continue that comply with the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.07, “Irregular Warfare” (IW), published Dec. 1, 2008. The directive instructs respective military departments to develop capabilities to address irregular challenges to U.S. national security.<br /> <br /> In seeking to provide what the warfighters and the nation require, especially with regard to the interagency (IA) process, DoD continues to mobilize Reserve Component Soldiers and has created the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce to provide individual civilian personnel to the existing provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). The Army also continues to train and field humanterrain teams to assist the brigade combat teams. The Army War College is researching PRT-like solutions to the ongoing need. The National Defense University is conducting a study to synthesize and provide recommendations to improve the IA process. And even the National Guard is fielding ad hoc agribusiness teams into Afghanistan to augment ongoing PRT and Civil Affairs efforts. However, none of these efforts, alone or together, will be the panacea to the nation’s requirements.<br /> <br /> DoD must develop additional capabilities specifically tailored to meet the Secretary of Defense’s requirements as stipulated in the DoD IW Directive: “[To] maintain capabilities and capacity so that the Department of Defense is as effective in IW as it is in traditional warfare in order to ensure that, when directed, the department can . . . Create a safe, secure environment in fragile states and, if required, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure restoration, and humanitarian relief.” And, in line with Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ efforts to move away from efforts to use “baroque and costly platforms” to provide capabilities, any solution to the capabilities gap in the IW arsenal should be as people-centric a solution as possible.<br /> <br /> The ongoing efforts listed above are not so targeted. Instead, they continue to be reactive within existing force structure and doctrinal paradigms.<br /> <br /> But the creation of Army Reconstruction Teams (ARTs) would not only be people-centric, it would provide a much-needed, new capability to combatant commanders as directed in the DoD Directive to “conduct IW independently of, or in combination with, traditional warfare.” And it would do so in the most cost-effective and qualitative manner by leveraging the operational Army Reserve.<br /> <br /> With the looming prospect of drastically tightened Defense budgets and decreased deployment commitments, placing ARTs in the Army Reserve would, first and foremost, guarantee available capability while minimizing the cost of standing up, equipping, and training the units. This capability will eventually be necessary only on occasion, so, unlike Active forces structured for constantly deployable capabilities, placing the ART structure in the Army Reserve would mitigate against its elimination from the force—thus maintaining the capacity the DoD Directive mandates—when funding becomes limited. And the Army already has most of its civil affairs, engineering, chemical, medical, and legal structure in the Reserves.<br /> <br /> As Title 10 federal forces, Army Reserve ARTs would be subject to Active Component IW doctrine, theater-specific training requirements, and operational Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) deployment schedules—without being tied to competing homeland security or state missions. Army Reserve ARTs would provide ready accessibility and compatibility to support theater combatant commanders without lengthy training or cross-leveling of personnel.<br /> <br /> The majority of the Army’s current Reconstruction Team ([embedded] ePRT/PRT) experience already resides with individuals from the Army Reserve and Guard. (See expanded article online at www.roa.org.) Because the Army Reserve accepts both Reserve and Guard officers and senior NCOs, this existing talent and experience could immediately be captured with the establishment of the ARTs. This is particularly true in filling the critical team leader position from a select group of senior colonels with a combat arms background and brigadelevel command, and combat experience.<br /> <br /> With the ARTs in the Army Reserve—versus the Active Army—team members would also likely serve longer assignments, which would translate into better-trained teams with greater mission-specific knowledge. Once assembled, Army Reserve ARTs could continue to train for their respective theaters—for years if necessary—before being deployed. In addition to attending their annual training events, such as ART-specific training, an interagency scenario war game, or even overseas visits to their aligned combatant command, they would have monthly training assemblies dedicated to ART-related requirements, such as foreign-language training (via Rosetta Stone software available through AKO) or conducting cultural and theater-specific research and training. Additionally, extended tenures would allow the Reserve ARTs to gain greater experience from extended interagency training and networking, and possibly multiple deployments. Reserve ARTs would also be able to seek out other available training for greater preparedness and utility, such as defense language training, Red Team training, and Information Operations training. With proper team leaders in place, this extended time for team training and team building would make these ARTs extremely proficient in their IW mission.<br /> <br /> Additionally, if the ARTs are capably led and fully trained they would be also be available in accordance with the ARFORGEN readiness cycle to support non-IW capability requirements of the COCOMs such as disaster relief or Theater Security Cooperation and Engagement missions.<br /> <br /> Having the ARTs as Army Reserve modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) units with unit identity codes would allow for better tracking of this capability via unit status reporting and permit the ARTs to have— and deploy with—unit weapons and equipment. The latter has been a tremendous impediment to the PRTs fielded in Iraq as they deployed-in unequipped and, given the poorly coordinated memorandum of understanding between DoD and [Department of State], were completely dependent upon the resources of their supporting Army/Marine structure for all their organizational and office equipment. It also forced the military members of the ePRTs/PRTs to deploy through the individual replacement system, which was ill-suited to prepare and equip them for their final destinations and missions.<br /> <br /> Modular Army Reserve ARTs would be able to directly deploy to any theater in an expeditionary capacity as a followon capability to either traditional (conventional) combat forces or nonconventional forces for full-spectrum IW missions— including “a variety of steady-state and surge DoD activities and operations: counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; counterinsurgency; and stability operations that, in the context of IW, involve establishing or reestablishing order in a fragile state.” <br /> <br /> As such, ARTs would support the Army Chief of Staffs vision of a 21st century Army that is a “versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations operating on a rotational cycle.” Combatant commanders would have at their disposal the core of future interagency teams—the ARTs—to employ when needed without waiting for the non-DoD members to act, and still be ready to receive and employ their personnel when they do arrive in order to better achieve the Secretary of Defense’s Strategic Planning Guidance to “achieve more decisive and enduring results” in future conflicts. And the Army Reserve ARTs would sustain across the ARFORGEN process.<br /> <br /> Finally, putting the ART in the Army Reserve would facilitate the high likelihood of members becoming “joint reconstruction teams” with the positions of engineer, physician, lawyer, information operations/public affairs, and even select team leaders being open to Reserve Component officers from of any of the armed services. As Reserve Joint Reconstruction Teams, they would leverage the talents of all the Reserve Components while—in the era of Goldwater/Nichols— providing the Reserves with legitimately joint structure (and interagency structure when fully staffed in theater) with which to train and joint-qualify the senior leadership of their respective service Reserves.<br /> <br /> These proposals would provide the nation a new “wholeof- government” capability around which exit strategies for future conflicts could coalesce. By enabling combat and civil affairs units to systematically disengage to refit for other missions, as well as providing a doctrinal bridge to a formal interagency team, the proposed Reserve Joint Reconstruction Teams would offer DoD a ready-made exit strategy and provide the wherewithal to doctrinal transition from combat to completely non-DoD conditions in future theaters of conflict.<br /> <br /> BG Bud R. Jameson Jr. Served on an ePRT in Iraq from 2007-2008 and commands the 926th Engineer Brigade in Montgomery, Ala.

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